INTRODUCTION

ATHENS AND JERUSALEM

To say that the roots of modern democracy intertwine somewhere deep between Jerusalem and Athens is to invite a charge of heresy from both directions. The Christian Father Tertullian thrust the two cities worlds apart: 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? Or the Academy with the Church?'[1] What could Christian revelation learn from all the speculations of Greek philosophy? On the other hand, what help, asked the rationalist, could human institutions derive from intimations of another, divine, plane of existence?

In all its essentials, democracy began with the Greeks; they bequeathed us a term, attached to a specific form of government, which in the twentieth century has caught the imaginations of the Western world in an irresistible grip. Most modern books on democracy acknowledge a semantic, and in some ways a historical, debt to ancient Athens. The 2500th anniversary of democracy – in 1992–3 – was celebrated in a widespread festival of seminars, radio broadcasts, books and articles.[2] All are prepared to acknowledge the Athenians' demonstration that a people (however narrowly that term may be construed) can govern itself. Their experiment was confined to two extraordinary centuries following the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 BCE. For most of the years between their time and ours democracy became a historical curiosity, observed only as one element of the so-called mixed constitution. The Roman republicans, for example, would admit to democratic aspects of their constitution allowing for tribal assemblies, tribunicial action and some popular voting, but under no circumstance would their senatorial oligarchy contemplate the people governing themselves. The coming of empire would plunge the democratic idea further into the recesses of the Western subconscious, whence it would be brought to light by the flickering candles of a few independent acolytes.

As an isolated and remote historical experiment, then, could the Athenian democracy bequeath us any more than an evocative name and, to the modern mind, a largely unrealizable ideal? More sympathetic observers

testify to a set of institutions which, however impossible they might now be to replicate, were bathed in ideals of universal validity. For all their bickering, the people who fashioned those institutions grounded them upon equality, freedom and justice. Their commitment was dignified by a respect for one another as persons, and an investment in each other's welfare. The ethos they cultivated is as evident in their architecture, plays, poems and histories, in the speeches of their politicians, as in the nature of the institutions. It could not fail to shine through even the speculations of philosophers overtly hostile to democracy who believed themselves obliged, perhaps by the ethos itself, to give respectful weight to the views of their adversaries.

If Athens inspires some genuflexion amongst the moderns, Jerusalem scarcely attracts a nod. The few who set out to revive an all but lost example can point out certain institutional resemblances between democratic Athens and the period of the tribal federation of Israel (and that is, strictly, before Jerusalem was annexed to Israel).[3] Both established political communities, run by all the adult males, in repudiation of tyranny. In both traditions the enlivening myth was the repulse of oriental despotic monarchies – Egypt and the Canaanite city-states in the case of Israel, Persia in the case of Athens. Towards the end of the seventh century BCE both moved to enact complex legal codes. Despite their imperfections in practice, both upheld the ideal of equality, and both accorded a special dignity to the poor.

Yet there were significant differences between them. To think of Athens is to remember a remarkable political system and all the philosophical and artistic energy seething within it. For us, the religious ceremonies that constituted meetings of the Athenian assembly and the religious fervour that called out festivals into theatre or marketplace seem incidental to the celebration of civic life; but to think of Jerusalem is to begin with the religion. It is not just that the 'history' of Israel comes to us in the form of religious books. The religion of Israel induced a radical change in human understanding. From the surge of new thinking about God flowed everything else – including political, material and intellectual culture. In ancient Jewish religion God assumed a novel role: the liberator of slaves. Religion was prised away from nature; breaking through the rhythm of the seasons, it spurned magical incantation and shunned propitiation, the routines of paganism. The Israelite God placed himself at the head of his chosen people as their personal leader on a march through history. Whereas nature religion had entombed people in their slavery and tightened their subjection to the forces of nature and to the king representing those forces, Judaism unlocked human personality, nurturing it in a personal relationship with the godhead. While through and through a religious experience, this relationship was irrefutably political because it was irresistibly liberating. Pagan religion was an apparatus of political subordination. Judaism tacked

a light political structure on to the ark of religion. Israelite political life was but a consequence of the all-important religious fact – the relationship between God and people.

Between tribal, or 'pre-state', Israel and democratic Athens there were resemblances in institutions and attitudes of a 'democratic' nature, although the term can only be applied accurately to Athens.[4] There was also a great difference: we approach Athenian democracy through its political organization; we approach ancient Jewish liberation through its religion.

Despite the resemblances, and despite the impact of both experiences on Western culture, in practical terms we now find them all but discarded by contemporary democratic theory. The gulf between ancient and modern democracy is greater and more significant than the physical impossibility of reproducing the Athenian assembly in most modern settings. The differences are neither fully explained by the systematic efforts of some moderns – the American Founders, for example – to vilify Athenian democracy, nor removed by the romantic attempts of some nineteenth-century British – George Grote or John Stuart Mill, for example – to assimilate all that was admirable in Athenian democracy to British political life.[5] The major difference *in kind* between the Athenian and the modern democratic state is that the modern is a *secular state* in a way that the Greek was not. Since the religious element was integral to both Jerusalem and Athens, one might reasonably expect the modern democrat to repudiate both traditions. This would seem to be the secular route of modern 'liberal democracy', certainly under the urging of Benjamin Constant.[6] For other reasons, Marxists would take a similar course. At least thirty years of democratic writing have generally neglected the religious contributions of the Athens and Jerusalem traditions. Some recent discussions insist that the modern state has only become modern by becoming secular – that is, by breaking entirely with religious traditions.[7]

What this approach largely overlooks is that the secularization of the modern state was an inevitable and integral outcome of the Jerusalem tradition. It was essential to the Calvinist Reformation that the realms of spiritual and temporal affairs be resolutely and rigidly separated so that both might more properly be understood and dealt with. The most obvious political statements of this process came in the writings of Hobbes, Locke and Roger Williams, but in a sense it reached back to the beginnings of the Jewish tradition, where liberation from slave-states pronounced once and for all that the rule of God had nothing to do with physical oppression: the Israelite God taught people not to join together what should be kept separate.[8] The Western religious tradition was founded on separation. Secularization was the necessary response of prophetic religion to the rise of the all-powerful temporal regime.

THE AUGUSTINIAN MOMENT

Behind the demand for secularization stands the central notion of the two cities. We might, in the fashion of our times, have called this whole study the 'Augustinian moment': the moment of discovery that all human institutions in the *sæculum* – in the secular realm – are imperfect attempts at creating order and must all be subjected to perpetual revision. The 'City of God', about which glorious things were spoken in the Old Testament, was elaborated by the Psalms, the prophets and the Christian 'kingdom of God'; but behind it also hovers the mirage of Plato's *kallipolis*, the perfect order which can only be perceived in the heavenly realm. Whereas Plato could only hope that one day 'philosophers' might take power and impose a perfect order on earth, Augustine the realist saw that the city of the earth would always be mediate, partial and imperfect, and always the target of radical criticism from the perfect order; so the City of God cast its harsh light upon the city of the earth through the lens of the third 'person' of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, focusing upon the affairs of humans and awakening in those who would see a constant alertness to renewal and reform.[9] The Reformation, postulating two 'kingdoms', insisted upon the total difference between the spiritual order and the temporal or secular world of physical beings and objects.

The thoroughness with which the Reformation tide of secularization drenched the modern world, however, in time almost leached away from democratic memory all hint of the two-cities doctrine which first insisted upon the tentative and probationary nature of all government. The decisive departure from more authoritarian forms of rule was the realization – under pressure from the two-realms teaching – that no government was good enough to rule human affairs without limits in time and competence. Constitutionalism, an essential ingredient of modern democracy, is equally an essential outcome of the separations enforced by the two-realms doctrine. When most modern democrats insist upon constitutional controls, checks and balances, the integration of opposition into orderly political processes, and the *separation* of state and society, they are implicitly building into modern institutions cautions about human affairs conveyed by the Jerusalem tradition. Even the most secular version of modern democracy claims as its 'moral distinctiveness' from ancient or direct democracy its implicit distrust, and its radical chastening, of human power systems.[10]

There are two sides to the chastening of human power. Constitutionalists like the American Founders were ever alert to the possible abuse of state power. They often seemed less aware of other forms of oppression by some humans over others: for example, the accumulation of vast economic resources under, but often beyond the reach of, the law; the exertion of power over women and children in that private bastion of the liberal democrat, the 'castle' of the man's home; or even the frankly criminal use

of power in defiance of the law. As Bernard Bosanquet long ago recognized, there needs to be a measure of public power to hinder the *private* hindrances of people's freedoms.[11] Prophetic religion taught the injustice of a 'justice' which ranks and orders people, assigning some to subordination, disadvantage and legalized oppression. Radical criticism would teach the democratic polity not only to keep state power under control, but also to examine the social and economic layering of society in which many were allowed or even forced by the system to suffer.

Under the capitalist dispensation reform languishes as the unspoken and often forgotten constituent of democracy. The ancient Athenians, while labouring under a static conception of 'the good', knew something of the need for reform through a system run by and for the poor. Their notion of *isonomia* – equal apportionment under the law – could recognize the need to use the law to redress social and economic imbalance: the law was the vehicle of state power against social and economic injustice.[12]

The moral demand of democracy is volatile and dangerous. Stability is under threat where righteous scrutiny reveals a 'justice' that is unjust, and where an ordered society is seen to be deranged under the prophetic vision. The 'incalculable inspirations of grace', in Lindsay's term, themselves require control: that, indeed, was Hobbes's preoccupation. How do we know that the new claims of justice against a settled order will not themselves turn out to be unjust? They will always appear unjust to those who legally benefit from the existing order. How, indeed, can power be discharged for the purposes of justice and yet be controlled?

These are delicate questions, yet, as John Dunn has argued, capitalist economic analysis has had no trouble in insisting upon the need 'to reinvent economic agency all the time' even against the inertia of monopoly, the extraction of unearned rents and the protection of 'comforting routines'. This inertia, recognized in the political sphere, is the enemy of democratic notions of justice, and yet the liberal order has managed to resist most attempts at social and political reconstruction. The political vision is more dim, but there remains 'the permanent need to reinvent political and social agency throughout the world in which we now live'.[13]

If we were able to peel back the layers of secularization we would discover that the pressure for reform exerted by the two-realms doctrine implied this need to reconstruct a more equal and cooperative sense of community. In religious terms this means individuals conscious of their intimate relationship to God, their infinite, and therefore equal, worth in God's sight, and the dialectical and communal nature of their discovery of the truth. In a secular world we may postulate a realm of ethical conscience which likewise roots out those defects that create the need for reform and activates the mechanisms of state power.

In the 1990s champions of liberal democracy happily announce its universal triumph. The victory march has long been under way. After the

Second World War 'no doctrines [were] advanced as antidemocratic' amid the 'basic agreement' that democracy was 'the highest form of political or social organization'.[14] As Giovanni Sartori observed, 'officially' democracy had 'no enemies left'.[15] Now, following the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, there is no gainsaying the 'universal acclaim that democracy enjoys at this historical moment'.[16] Yet there is a Eurocentric flavour to the praise of capitalist democracy. Where apparently capitalist economies are under full collapse, and the direst poverty is the condition of most people, it strains credulity to speak of the triumph of capitalism. Most people in the former Soviet Union have yet to sample the economic advantages of an introduced capitalism; how long can the failures of former communist economies be blamed for a legacy of commodity shortages, exiguous wages and uncontrollable inflation? In the 'Third World' there are many prepared to blame the capitalist order for the abrading poverty of the great majority of the population. The one institution that embraced the entire South American continent, largely ignoring state boundaries, the Catholic church, gave birth to a vocal minority within its own ranks that criticized capitalism as the anti-Christian source of all miseries. We shall encounter liberation theology at the end of this book, but we may note here that, whatever modifications its exponents may have made to their *theology* in the face of sustained criticism, they have maintained to this day their belief in the iniquity of the capitalist system and their conviction that it is 'the greatest evil, the rotten root, the tree that produces those fruits we all know: poverty, hunger, sickness ... and the death of the majority'.[17]

An ideology which claims that there is no alternative to the liberal-democratic regimes forgets too easily that the institutions of representative government are fashioned to accommodate change. This original function remains, even though the capitalist ideology aims to control the system in order to consolidate existing power structures. The emergence of modern democratic government is part of the romantic story.[18] What could be more 'romantic' than the Pilgrim migrations, or the Levellers' *Agreement of the People*, or the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, or the fantastic demands of working people for the right to form government? The modern types of democracy, no less than the ancient, were born in change, rebellion, even revolution, against all odds. Embedded in their structures are the elements of progress. The institutions of democracy are more radical than bourgeois rationalizations or elitist theories allow.

When we ask what is modern democracy, we should be sensible about recognizing common usage. We may welcome, with John Dunn, the modest achievements of modern states called 'representative democracies': 'moderate government, a system of rule which minimizes the direct risks which governmental power poses to ... subjects'; 'a modest measure of governmental responsibility to the governed'; and making the modern state and

the modern capitalist economy 'safe' for each other.[19] We are now also compelled to recognize, again with Dunn, that democracy takes shape under an 'incessant and turbulent encounter' between accepted state forms and an energizing idea.[20]

There are many elements in the blending of institution, procedure and ethos that go to make up the democratic state. Apart from recollections of Athens, they would include the legacy of the feudal order, remnants of Roman law, and memories of historical acts of liberation.[21] While never forgetting the central place of Athens, this book is mainly concerned with the liberating and democratizing aspects of the Western religious tradition. Although interpretations of that tradition (or misinterpretations) have had their negative – at times devastating – impact, the core of that tradition repudiates oppression and liberates the human spirit.

DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION

It is not possible entirely to separate out religious influences from other tributaries to the democratic stream. Feudal contracts, for example, though forged for practical reasons, were surrounded by religious sanction, while feudal rulers lived in close, if sometimes uneasy, relationship with the church. The reception of Roman law in central Europe could hardly be unaffected by knowledge of canon law. Even secular rebellions could be motivated by self-confident ideas of human independence religious in origin.

It *is* possible, however, to discern aspects of the religious tradition that have a direct relevance to democratic thought, and an intimate historical connection with the emergence of democratic government. The religious influence may not be the *only* source, but its impact is sufficient to warrant special treatment here. Its aspects include: individualism; freedom; equality; community; covenant and contract; limited government; political opposition; reform and reconstruction; the force of outside direction; secularization and the constitutionalism of the two kingdoms.

Individualism

Scarcely any idea could have had more impact on the modern West – Catholic and secular as well as Protestant – than the Reformation doctrine of 'the priesthood of all believers'. In its religious aspect it linked each faithful person in a direct relationship with God, bypassing church and government and all the world's dealings and all the forces of nature. Religious doctrine not only empowered individual people, but also laid a heavy responsibility upon them to interpret the scriptures for themselves, to listen to the voice of God themselves, and to render an account of their own actions as a consequence. A similar responsibility, learnt from religious

experience, towards the running of the secular community propelled many into public life. Since they often acknowledged no other qualifications than a calling, the politically active could emerge from any walk of life, opening up public affairs to democratic influences.

Freedom

Those who learnt to read scripture for themselves discovered, in a passage explicitly contrasting freedom and slavery, that the truth would make them free (John 8.31–6). Augustine taught that grace enlarged the will of those who had freely chosen to believe with a dynamism that asserted individual freedom against all earthly powers.[22] Students of scripture, seeking their own path to the truth, worked in Milton's 'mansion-house of liberty'.[23] Under the guidance of scripture one of the Levellers long anticipated Mill in demanding freedom of expression: 'better many errors of some kind suffered than one useful truth be obstructed or destroyed'.[24] Above all, freedom of worship, as both Roger Williams and John Locke taught in the seventeenth century, was the paradigm of all freedoms. Forced worship was less than useless; so also the worthlessness of forced 'consent' was a lesson to be learnt in the secular as in the religious world.

Equality

The religious tradition held that each individual person was infinitely precious in the sight of God. If infinitely, *equally* precious. Christians had learnt in scripture of a kingdom in which the humble and meek were exalted and those who wished to be first were put last. The song of Mary celebrated how God had 'routed the proud and all their schemes', had 'brought down monarchs from their thrones, and raised on high the lowly' (Luke 1.51–2). There was comfort in these words for the populist and the revolutionary, but the consuming pacifism of the gospels surely renders these teachings a dramatized negation of rank and station, a proclamation of equality.

In particular the Western religious tradition rejects economic inequality. This is expressed through 'God's preference for the poor'.[25] In Judaism, protection for the poor is set down as law in Deuteronomy. The same explicit anger against poverty as expressed by the prophets emerges in the gospels and in the Epistle of James, and is a recurrent theme throughout the Christian tradition to the present, especially when it encounters the political order.

Community

To eliminate obstructive inequalities and to harmonize believers into a unity, the early Christian church practised the collection and distribution of goods according to needs. There was more to their fellowship than an economic arrangement. However sharply the Reformation etched the outlines of individual personality, the path to salvation was communal. Augustine's *City of God* was a community of equals united in their unqualified love of God, and in their free compliance with the injunction to love neighbour as self. From the first emancipation of the Israelites to the present work for the liberation of peasants in Peru or Chile, the Jewish and Christian religions inspire a love turned first upon God but radiating back through the whole fellowship. Love is both a matter of personal piety and the constituent of a wide communion of souls seeking, through mutual assistance and corporate study and worship, a path through this world to their final salvation in Zion. Where necessary, it also implies political action.

Incorporation into a community engendered the highest form of individualism. The expectation of redemption was so certain as to allow the individual to leave self behind. Communal worship and mutual service meant a transcendence of the self in search of the higher purpose of the community. It also led to a speculative, even reckless, investment in the welfare of others. John Winthrop exhorted his congregation to 'delight' in each other.

A political association – even the best imaginable democracy – could never go so far. Yet the congregation had much to teach the political community, and did so directly through the Puritan migration to New England, and the Cromwellian interregnum in Britain. Our story encompasses the establishment of civil institutions in the colonies that grew out of primary democratic experience when the church congregation, having attended to ecclesiastical matters, became the town community for work-a-day affairs. In both secular and religious aspects they had learnt from a long religious heritage that a communal business meeting is a practical device for finding out something that might not otherwise have been known, or for formulating some policy alternative that might otherwise have been neglected. Their heritage included the medieval conciliarists, the Anabaptist congregation, the Levellers' conventicle. In all these the people discovered truth through discussion. As modern democracies came of age, it would often be church communities that would instruct the political movements of ordinary people – Chartists, trade-unionists in their chapters or '*chapels*', labour electoral leagues, and a host of welfare organizations formed to bring aid to the needy or to exert pressure on governments to attend to neglected services.

Covenant and contract

If the formation of their community was a socio-historical event, the ancient Jews were convinced that the tie was religious. The covenant God made with his people bound them not only to himself but also to one another. Whether it was first borrowed from a pagan vassal-treaty or not, the idea was uniquely fashioned in the Mosaic covenant. With God as one party, the covenant limited the extent of human agency in the government of a community – a powerful idea in the pre-dawn of modern democracy. It was taken up by Calvinists everywhere: in France and Switzerland, Britain and the New England colonies.

Modern democrats also knew of the political contract through Plato and the Roman Epicureans. They had experience of royal charters and the business contract, but the Mosaic covenant was supremely suggestive to the towering contractarians. Hobbes, no less, saw the repudiation of the direct rule of God, and the establishment of the Jewish monarchy, as the second Fall and the beginning of the age of human perversity. As the moderns noted, it was with the covenant between God and people in the background that the prophet-priest Samuel insisted that any monarchy over Israel should be conditional upon the king himself upholding God's ultimate rule over and care for his people. In frequent reference to this example the modern political contract emerged – in Hobbes as a response to human excesses in the *sæculum*, and in Locke as a guarantee that governments should hold office only as long as their rule was legitimated by the consent of the people.

Limited government

Locke's covenant, and subsequently Rousseau's different version, were one avenue for insisting upon the control of government. But the religious tradition fostered a parallel ideology holding that *all* government must be kept under surveillance. We saw the force of Augustine's contention that all human agency is, by reason of the Fall, defective. The age of 'Israel without kings', or pre-state Israel, had with a consuming ferocity scorned the idea of human dynasties. The leader of the exodus and the covenant, the rule of 'judges', and the admonition of the prophets – all messengers of God without dynastic pretension – built up a withering case against monarchic rule. The kingship of God made royal power ultimately irrelevant.

Not that pre-state Jewish and Christian traditions held human organization – even coercive government – to be unnecessary, but they could not be called the work of God; and even if, in the end, all power emanates from God, no particular form of rule, and no particular ruler, could claim God's sanction. The ruler is functionally placed in jeopardy of the worst of all sins – pride. Demonstrably entering public consciousness through

religion, the idea that governments must be held suspect is central to modern democratic thought.[26]

Political opposition

If many ancient Jews devoted to God's rule would execrate kingship before it was established, they would surely oppose it once it came into being. The scriptures unveil the irrepressible source of political opposition which is an essential ingredient of modern democracy and the chief institutional differentia between the ancient and modern forms. If all governments are defective in some respects, and if all are to be subject to surveillance, it follows that an institution to carry out the scrutiny should be incorporated into the mechanisms of democratic rule. There were no such mechanisms under the Jewish monarchy, yet the Old Testament prophets afford an almost perfect paradigm of opposition. Armed with nothing but the word, and hoping for no personal reward or access to power, they rebuked kings and held nations to account for their evil-doing. They inspired 'monarchomachs' throughout the ages, from Knox, Buchanan and Rutherford to the Huguenots and Cromwell.

The prophets are an especially compelling source for modern democracy because of their uncontained fury, and their unmasked pain, at the institutional oppression of the weak – 'the widow and the fatherless', the cheated, the poor, the dispossessed, the accused, the enslaved. All around they saw institutional negation of the exodus, which they never ceased to retell as the foundational myth of a liberated people. Prophetic outrage – God's outrage – continued to run through the Christian gospel, through the martyrs, through medieval mendicant orders, to the forerunners of the Reformation and especially to the so-called 'radical Reformation'. New 'reformations', such as the Wesleyan revival, continued to be movements of and for the poor, and led, repeatedly, to criticism of governments.

Reform and reconstruction

The 'Augustinian moment' set up a constant pressure of criticism of all things, including government, in the temporal order. The Catholic world of the Middle Ages placed the responsibility for charitable work upon the church and its lay orders. The Reformation, however, as a consequence of its separation of spiritual and temporal realms, shifted responsibility for the physical well-being of people upon the secular authorities, to whom the messengers of the spiritual realm sent words of admonition. Particularly under the Calvinist world-view, the elect took on the prophetic duty of seeking out injustices and instructing the secular order to address and remedy them – to 'search out matters to the very bottom'.[27]

Calvinist congregations, meeting as town assemblies, provided the

nearest modern equivalent to the Athenian democracy. This meant wearing their secular hats to attend to civic responsibilities. Under the representative system, responsibility to guide discussion fell largely to organized political parties, to which Burke gave theoretical justification. His idea of opposition as a constructive measure was a kind of emergency remedy when things went wrong. Yet opposition was to grow into a continuous and permanent institution under the Westminster 'model', where it became a secularized version of perpetual criticism exerted by the City of God. As a secular instrument, opposition would not always be the agent of reform. Against a reforming government it could be the tool of conservatism or reaction. If the spiritual realm was monist in its intellectual commitment, the secular order in its very nature was pluralist; it was the condition of secularization that diverse political views should have equal access to the claims of morality.[28] In any case, as human institutions, both government and opposition could go awry. The existence of public agencies in tension, pitted by the system in recurrent competition, opened representative government to democratic influences and fashioned the mechanisms of reform.

The force of outside direction

For the democrat whose will has been fortified in the spiritual domain the need to pursue justice through political means comes as a divine imperative. It may be difficult for the spiritually directed person to distinguish between acting autonomously as a responsible citizen and surrendering the will.[29] Many of the great democratic innovations have come as a response to such directives, but the liberalism of liberal democracy rejects the basis of such action as essentially not human, and therefore as not edifying to autonomous and self-respecting human beings. Shirley Robin Letwin, for example, dismissed John Locke from the ranks of the liberals because of his religious 'fundamentalism': for in Locke civil law 'merely provides aid for obeying divine law with greater assurance'.[30]

There is a danger here of thinking that direction from the spiritual realm (or from the word of God) has a one-to-one correspondence between each civil action and a specific instruction. The Calvinist position held God to be so far above the human order that it would be presumptuous for humans to expect individual direction for each dealing with worldly affairs.[31] Locke did not divest the individual person of civic responsibility for his or her actions; nor is this the intent of prophetic religion. The ancient scriptures give colourful accounts of the prophet seized and shaken by the Word of God. Though hesitant and full of misgiving, he acts true to the call of righteousness within. Yet the prophet is also depicted as an autonomous human agent, arguing with God and pleading for mercy in God's punishment of the wicked. Though taken hold of by the spirit, the prophet blazes with a human anger and laments with a human misery.

It is with the strength of the spiritual armament, however, that we are at present concerned. Many men and women have acted decently, in pursuit of justice, out of a sense of civic responsibility and a fellow-feeling with all humanity. They might be instructed by humanistic observations of a Montesquieu, a Bentham, a J. S. Mill, a John Rawls, or a hundred other modern democratic writers. In some countries they may be martyred for their principles.

There remains a sense in which the prophet addresses injustice with a peculiarly irresistible force. John Stuart Mill himself recognized in religious conviction the 'element' that 'made a monk of Wittenberg, at the meeting of the Diet of Worms, a more powerful social force than the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and all the princes there assembled'.[32] As that same monk, Martin Luther, exclaimed: 'Our theology is certain . . . because it sets us outside ourselves.'[33] It may be that the outside direction makes Luther, and many other religious and political reformers, from the trembling Moses to the defiant Roger Williams or the resolute John Wesley, declare: 'Here I stand. I can do no other.' Yet together with the divine commission comes an unexampled resolve, often explained, whether by metaphor or no, as 'superhuman'. Reinhold Niebuhr, democrat as well as theologian, wrote: 'the most effective opponents of tyrannical government are today, as they have been in the past, men who can say "We must obey God rather than men" '.[34]

It does not require an instruction from God for a person to experience the force of outward direction. Plato poured his energies into educating people to a point where they could glimpse the image of 'transcendent good' which so reconstructs the human life that those who see it must share their experience by extending justice and goodness to their fellows. While the path to enlightenment is education, the final vision is something beyond education or human agency, but takes on the force of command from an order that is beyond the self and beyond the tangible world.[35]

Secularization and the two kingdoms

Every ordered community needs its defence against a possible 'riot of irresponsible divinations'.[36] The Antinomians of New England were told it was dangerous to talk of God as their personal friend, and church leaders feared for their flocks being 'blown up and down (like chaff) by every wind of new notions'.[37] At this very time, in old England Thomas Hobbes was addressing the clash among 'transcendent interests'. Conflict, particularly between religious dogmas, each claiming a universal validity, led to civil war.[38] The Calvinist tradition in which *Leviathan* was written would suppress no religious view but the physically coercive, since under the dispensation of grace some novel view might lead to the truth. Nor should any religious creed be sanctioned by coercive power, as this would be a

blasphemous confusion of the spiritual and temporal realms, entailing an impossible compulsion of free wills. The remedy is a purely secular order that makes no appeal to religious sanction; yet 'Hobbes does not have to deny the existence of God in order to secularize the political world; in fact, by destroying the connection between God's nature and human virtues, Hobbes enlists divine "care of mankind" in the very project of secularization'.[39]

The Calvinist project, then, is to separate the temporal and the spiritual orders in a more sharply defined way than even Luther's 'two kingdoms' doctrine had envisaged. Since grace and salvation were God's work, and therefore perfected in the elect, the saints could cease to worry about the care of their own souls. Secure in their expectation of salvation, they could focus upon the temporal realm which required the redemptive action of grace. Calvin's apparent rejection of the natural order 'implies not extreme otherworldliness but on the contrary, the rejection of otherworldliness in favor of a spiritual commitment to this world'.[40] In this way, separating the secular and the spiritual orders so that the one might more forcefully impinge upon the other represented the final working-out of the relationship between Augustine's City of God and the city of the earth.[41]

Once the state was recognized as fully secular, the separation of the orders could be entrenched along constitutional boundaries; their restraint upon government power reflected the removal of divine sanction from the authority of a pharaoh, a despot or a king. Henceforth government as a secular affair among humans should be subjected to the consent of the governed, and to them alone. Far from this excluding the 'inspirations of grace', it opened political institutions to winds of reform from the spiritual world, or from the realm of conscience; the difference was that the spiritual order would work upon the political only through the power of the Word – whose instruments were preaching and persuasion, rhetoric and discussion, which for the proponents of a 'classical theory' were the essence of democracy.

DEMOCRACY AND SECESSION

The following account attempts to present neither a full history of religious influences upon democracy nor a detailed analysis of those specific influences out of context. It proceeds through a series of 'analytical moments', in more or less chronological order, in the history of Western political thought. At the fulcrum of this chronology stands the 'Augustinian moment'. Throughout the narrative we observe a train of ever-narrowing secessions from some settled, and often domineering, order. Prophetic religion is here taken to mean the repeated attempts of humans to relate directly to the word of God, which, in every case, sets them at odds with

the values and practices of the prevailing secular order – at odds with the world.[42]

RELIGION AND CAPITALISM

In time each 'secession' or religious renewal will find the temporal powers moving back inexorably into the cleared space, rebuilding Babel from the rubble of each rebellion. In the democratic era a most pervasive domination inheres in the capitalist economic order.[43] Churches that were in origin representatives of the spiritual realm have become respectable denizens of the 'bourgeois' economic and social world. Congregations that were once gatherings of the poor, inflamed with a mission to serve the even poorer, have become solid pillars of a settled social order. This syncretistic transformation has long since been addressed in the field of sociology and economic history.

Any book that makes so bold as to approach the topic 'religion and the rise of democracy' must surely recall R. H. Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926). It is not my purpose here either to supplement or to refute Tawney's work. It is, rather, to tell a parallel tale with a different emphasis. So persuasive has the Weber–Tawney thesis on the 'Protestant ethic' become that it is often difficult to see the modern churches as anything but beams and girders of a capitalist economic structure. Tawney was aware that the purpose of religion was different from the routine manifestations of religious observance in respectable society. Yet the churches had fallen askew, having inherited from late Puritanism an unwarranted affection for the capitalist order.

Although Tawney acknowledged his debt to the German sociologist Max Weber, it is not strictly accurate to speak of a Weber–Tawney thesis. As the title of his book announced, Weber had emphasized the 'spirit of capitalism', which, in his treatment, meant the transmigration of the spirit from the religious realm to the world of commerce.[44] This capitalist spirit emerged from the Calvinist doctrine of the 'calling', which made it a moral duty to work hard, to waste neither time nor resources, to save, but not to spend on frivolous luxuries. Such behaviour created the surplus earnings and profits that could be ploughed back into capital formation. Weber himself invested much in the supposition that the capitalist world was created by the ideas of the Calvinists and their fellow-travellers (although evidence for the existence of capitalism since before the Reformation seems irrefutable).[45]

In preferring to avoid talk of the 'spirit' of capitalism, Tawney exhibited 'a traditional British preference for the concrete fact rather than abstract ideas'. He recognized the independent existence of capitalism as an economic force, and suggested a reciprocal relationship between Protestant behaviour and the capitalist economy.[46] He is credited with greater fidelity

to historical evidence than Weber; and his interpretation had a profound and controversial influence on Reformation historiography without in the end convincing too many historians of a direct link between capitalism and the faithful practitioners of Calvinism.[47]

Coming from a Christian socialist tradition, Tawney was exercised by the chronic misformation of capitalist society, and taxed the Christian churches for their failure to prevent it, or at least to modify its excesses into a more socially benign form. In a later article (1935) he saw Christianity suffering 'at the hands of history a double deformation', undergoing 'a process of dilution and petrifaction – dilution by the world, petrifaction by the elect'.[48]

Tawney regretted the passing of the ethic of the Middle Ages, when the church had undertaken the care of its people throughout all aspects of life, and had issued strictures against usury, profit-taking and trade for its own sake. For him the modern problem was essentially 'a dualism which regards the secular and religious aspects of life, not as successive stages within a larger unity, but as parallel and independent provinces, governed by different laws, judged by different standards, and amenable to different authorities'.[49] The church, having been reduced by secularization to a mere department of social and economic life, had failed to extend its influence into the economic sphere. Tawney would scarcely recognize the interpretation, here endorsed, that secularization was a central project of the Reformation. He shared with the Christian socialists what would surely have been anathema to the Reformers – the wish to sacralize the whole of society.[50] The failure of the churches to moderate capitalism – and tyranny and oppression of many kinds – remains as historical fact. Tawney wavered on the brink of attacking the churches as un-Christian: 'A Christianity which resigns the economic world to the devil appears to me, in short, not Christianity at all.'[51] To the extent that they condoned unlimited acquisition, the churches were 'most sharply opposed to the teaching ascribed to the Founder of the Christian faith'.[52]

To criticize the churches for failing to stem the capitalist tide – and even tending the floodgates – is justified. Stated baldly, however, the case against them does not give due weight to many mitigations of the industrial system or to a host of social reforms inspired by religious faith. Still less does it account appropriately for the forces of religion on the emergence of democracy. Tawney's concerns were not our present ones – nor could they be, as long as he was unwilling to maintain a political system open to all influences.[53]

THE REALM OF CONSCIENCE AND MODERN POLITICS

It would be tempting, with Tawney, to drive a wedge between the life of the churches and 'the teaching ascribed to the Founder of the Christian

faith'. The failure of the churches, and of many others claiming to act under the guidance of the Western religious tradition, extends beyond conniving at the disfigurements of capitalism (to use John Dunn's phrase).[54] The story cannot deny inter-faith persecution, violent suppression of 'heretics', the perfidy of crusaders, inquisitors and conquistadors. The fiend of the Holocaust usurped the name Christian and appropriated a tortured version of the cross as the emblem of his iniquity. Most Christians would see in Hitler the Antichrist, and many died opposing him. They would disown all manifestations of oppression and violent conquest in the name of religion as, at best, monstrous error, at worst, betrayal of a religion of love and peace.

The following account seeks to trace, through the series of 'secessions' already mentioned, a thread of renovated prophetic religion kept faithful to exodus and cross. The matter is hardly so simple. Often the conservators of a simple faith were also – apparently in good conscience – perpetrators of betrayal. Luther, misled by his own misconstruction of Paul, was virulent in his anti-Semitism and violent in his rejections of the peasants;[55] Zwingli drowned Anabaptists, and Calvin burnt Servetus at the stake; pilgrims in old and New England were experts in drowning and burning and pressing.

No doubt the worst excesses may be put down to error or betrayal, or to an opportunistic 'devil' quoting scripture to his own ends. Too often the representatives of the church, including Luther himself, forget Luther's injunction to 'leave it to the Word'. Yet, too often also, leaving it to the Word means an unconscionable quietism, and therefore surely a complicity with injustice. At least Luther knew that he was at once saved and yet sinner; what other pilgrim could avoid the same confession? Augustine, in all his realism, recognized that the church sat squarely within the city of the earth and was as sorely in need of redemption as the rest of the temporal creation.

The story of religion and the rise of democracy is therefore fraught with paradox. Democracy must remain in and of the secular world, insulated through its constitutional fortifications from the consequences of 'the incalculable inspirations of grace'. Yet the burden of this story is that democracy has taken shape, like molten glass, under the breathing of the spirit. It is a uniquely fashioned vessel open wide to reformatory (as well as conservative) influences. Paul or Augustine might now reflect that, like government itself, democracy is part of the gift of providence to a world crying out for order, peace and justice.

In the end 'the children of light' can only look back on their patchy inheritance with a humility that entreats for forgiveness, just as Pope John XXIII begged forgiveness for centuries of anti-Semite preaching in the Christian church.[56] No human failing, however, can deflect the importunate demand of the exodus and the cross for justice; no amount of subsequent

oppression and cruelty can turn Moses into a slaver or Jesus into a warmonger. Their mission was love, freedom and human integrity, and this is yet the core of the Western religious heritage. Whatever static interferes with transmissions from the spiritual to the temporal world, the message is still love, joy, peace and justice. When the call for justice echoes back from the barriers of entrenched interest then undoubtedly the prophet must bring a sword and not peace; but the sword is swung in the secular world, clashing against the temporal shields of restraint and compromise; and while swinging the sword, the prophet ceases to be prophet and turns politician.

Prophets, *as* prophets, lay no hand on the sword. Their method is preaching, translated into the political rhetoric of the courts of secular power, but no less explosive for all its detachment from coercive measures. The democratic 'prophet' does not have to be motivated by religion. Throughout the democratic societies an 'ethical conscience' draws countless good citizens towards community-building. They are

> individuals who are trying to rise above whatever is separative and disruptive in their characters to what is highest in each of them. The life they attain is not based on subjective whim, but on the supra-individual authority of ethical conscience. They are ordering their lives with reference to a 'centre of judgment set above the shifting impressions of the individual and the flux of phenomenal nature'. They are unified with each other through loyalty to a self which is the same in all men.[57]

They may be inspired by secular writers and statespersons with a similar sense of community. It is not the purpose of the present study to pursue such writings. If we acknowledge that in the age of secularization much of the best democratic work is done by people of good conscience who are not 'believers', we have come to the point where we need to equate the spiritual order and the realm of conscience, at least at their point of impact upon politics. Either can be seen as a 'world apart', the realm of conscience offering a modern parallel to the ancient philosophers' sphere of contemplation. Both can supply political sustenance from outside the individual person. The philosopher might draw from Plato the idea

> that the goodness of human life depends heavily on our having a close connection with something eminently worthwhile that lies outside of ourselves. To live well one must be in the right psychological condition, and that condition consists in a receptivity to the valuable objects that exist independently of oneself . . . there are many different ways of trying to sustain [Plato's] attempt to connect the goodness of human life with some goodness external to one's soul.[58]

Since the Reformation project of secularization has progressed so far, one

might ask whether the contribution of the spiritual realm to democracy retains more than historical interest. If in political discourse the world of the spirit and the realm of human conscience may be equated, is there any longer point in distinguishing between the two?

A believing person will know intimately where his or her inspiration comes from, and will continue to distinguish the spiritual order from 'ordinary' human conscience. There is yet value in continuing to make the distinction, for at least two reasons. First, the realm of conscience has no deep tradition of distinguishing itself from the 'ordinary' or the 'temporal'. The decent citizen will exercise choice conscientiously in all dealings but will not necessarily be fortified by knowledge of a separate and constant order of things that gives substance and permanency to the source of justice welling up within. The spiritual realm, on the other hand, has had the lines of demarcation from the temporal world endlessly and repeatedly etched into the consciousness of post-Reformation religion. It is worth drawing renewed attention to this other order as an exemplar to the realm of conscience.

Second (and this must be stated with some caution because there are non-religious martyrs to just causes), there is a sense in which the call of the spiritual realm to political action is more urgent and compelling and irresistible than the direction of unaided conscience. Moses or Jeremiah or Amos; Christ in the Garden of Gesthemane; Stephen, Paul, Peter and a host of martyrs; Hus and Luther, Knox and Wesley, Bonhoeffer, Biko, Martin Luther King and Romero all yearn to have the cup pass from them, to leave behind the controversy, the abuse, the pain even unto death. Yet here they all do stand and do no other. They are not all 'democrats', but in their resolutely asserted freedom and justice they join the prophets of democracy. Leo Strauss made the contrast between the prophets and the realm of conscience's greatest saint of all – Socrates.[59] Socrates the wise made a remark obliquely critical of the butcher tyrant Critias, and 'this remark', wrote Xenophon, 'was reported to Critias'. Nathan the prophet went and stood unprotected before the all-powerful king, accusing him to his face of rapine and murder: 'Thou art the man.'

In summary, this study seeks to recapture the memory of religious contributions to an emerging democratic order. In formal terms, they operate at three levels: the institutional, in which the methods of tribal Israel, the early church, the medieval church council and the modern congregation successively revived the example of peoples attending to their common affairs; the popular, whereby the mass of the people caught the fervour of democratic freedom from congregation and revival meeting; and the personal, whereby democratic leadership was learnt by 'ordinary' people through study of the word and through managing the congregational or class meeting.

The Jewish and Christian traditions have had a much more profound effect upon democratic sentiment than influencing the shape of institutions, however. From the instant of founding – Moses' confrontation with Pharaoh; the exodus, the judges, the prophets; the impasse between the Roman prefect and Jesus at his trial; from the Reformation to the present – the traditions represent a radical chastening of human coercive power, devaluing its hold over individual conscience. For all its attempts at self-aggrandizement, earthly rule is made a laughing-stock when at its most pretentious. The royal panoply vainly exhibits the most fallible of all fallible human institutions.

Paradoxically, though the religious tradition emphasizes the unworthiness of all human endeavour, it nevertheless elevates the human individual in his or her direct association with God. Under God, humans are equal, and made ready for equal partnership and participation in their communal life. They must set up their own governmental organizations but, mindful of the inherent fault of governments and the damage they can do, they keep them under supervision through various mechanisms, such as institutional opposition that translates to the secular realm a role learnt from the prophets, and through constitutional barriers set first along the line of demarcation between church and state. Yet they breathe into the organs of government a demand for just action, insisting that they respond to this call under the pressure of criticism – according to the standard of goodness – of the City of God. Though tainted with corrupting power, democratic institutions are open to a 'prophetic' insistence that they use controlled power for just purposes.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 See E. A. Judge, 'Athens and Jerusalem', in Robert Sinclair (ed.), *Past, Present and Future*, Sydney, Australian Society for Classical Studies, 1990, pp. 90–8; Leo Strauss, *Jerusalem and Athens: Some Preliminary Reflections*, New York, The City College, 1967; James V. Schall, 'Jerusalem, Athens, Rome', in *Reason, Revelation and the Foundation of Political Philosophy*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1987.

2 For a survey and review, see the collection of articles edited by Bernard Grofman: 'The 2500th Anniversary of Democracy: Lessons of Athenian Democracy', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1993), pp. 471–90.

3 Irving M. Zeitlin, *Ancient Judaism: Biblical Criticism from Max Weber to the Present*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984, p. 102; cf. Frank E. Mamel, 'Christendom's Rediscovery of Judaism', *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. 40 (1991), pp. 15–32, at pp. 23–4.

4 Norman K. Gottwald, 'Social Class as an Analytic and Hermeneutical Category in Biblical Studies', *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. 112, no. 1 (1993), pp. 3–22.

5 Arlene W. Saxonhouse, 'Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 26, no. 3 (1993), pp. 486–90.

6 As discussed in Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, 2 vols, Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 284–6; cf. Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1964, pp. 56–73.

7 Quentin Skinner, 'The State', in T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 90–131; Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, vol. 1, p. 65; vol. 2, p. 17; Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 185–94; Steven B. Smith, 'Leo Strauss: Between Athens and Jerusalem', *Review of Politics*, vol. 53, no. 1 (1991), pp. 75–99.

8 Aaron Wildavsky, *The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader*, University Park, University of Alabama Press, 1984, pp. 27–8.

9 For a modern example of Augustine's reforming influence, see Edgar H. Brookes and Amry Vandenbosch, *The City of God and the City of Man in Africa*, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1964; cf. Graham Walker, *Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990.

10 George Kateb, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy', *Ethics*, vol. 91 (1981), pp. 357–74.

11 Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 4th edn, London, Macmillan, 1923, pp. 177–87.

12 M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 139.

13 John Dunn, in John Dunn (ed.), *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey, 508BC to AD1993*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 264–5.

14 Richard McKeon (ed.), *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, Paris, UNESCO, 1951, as quoted in Russel L. Hanson, 'Democracy', in Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, pp. 68–89, at p. 68.

15 Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 54. Sartori was somewhat sceptical about the UNESCO report referred to in the previous note: see *Democratic Theory*, pp. 8–9.

16 Robert C. Johansen, 'Military Policies and the State System as Impediments to Democracy', in David Held (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992 (*Political Studies*, vol. 40, special issue) pp. 99–115, at p. 99. Johansen is also sceptical about the democratic nature of cultures dominated by military policies; cf. Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky, 'Introduction' in Geoffrey Brennan and Loren E. Lomasky (eds), *Politics and Process: New Essays in Democratic Thought*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989; see also Kenneth Minogue (discussing Francis Fukuyama), 'Ideology after the Collapse of Communism', *Political Studies*, vol. 51 (1993), pp. 4–20, at pp. 4–5. We have not the scope here to examine the libraries of argument about the meaning of democracy, but could note one resigned comment: 'Discussions about democracy . . . are intellectually worthless because we do not know what we are talking about' (Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Du pouvoir*, Geneva, 1947, p. 338, as quoted in translation in Sartori, *Democratic Theory*, p. 9). Cf. the published translation, Bertrand de Jouvenel, *On Power* (trans. J. F. Huntington), Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1962, p. 276: 'All discussions of democracy, all arguments whether for it or against it, are stricken with intellectual futility, because the thing itself is indefinite.' Cf. W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56 (1955–6), pp. 183–7; cf. his *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*, New York, Schocken Books, 1964. For some more recent discussions, see Paul Hirst, *Representative Democracy and its Limits*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990; Paul Hirst, *The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G. D. H. Cole, J. N. Figgis and H. J. Laski*, London, Routledge, 1989; Adam Przeworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; Claus Offe, *Disorganized Capitalism*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985; David Held, 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?', in David Held (ed.), *Prospects for Democracy*, pp. 10–39; Barry Hindess, 'Democratic Theory', *Political Theory Newsletter* (Canberra), vol. 5 (1993), pp. 126–39.

17 Pastoral letter, quoted in Arthur F. McGovern, *Liberation Theology and its Critics: Towards an Assessment*, Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Books, 1989, pp. 138–9.

18 On the 'irresponsibility' of romantic democrats, see Hirst, *Representative Democracy*, pp. 135–7; cf. Hindess, 'Democratic Theory'.

19 'Conclusion', in Dunn (ed.), *Unfinished Journey*, pp. 249–50.

20 Ibid., p. 266.

21 Cf. Anthony Arblaster, *Democracy*, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1987, pp. 26–37.

22 See James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 197–8.
23 John Milton, *Areopagitica* (1644), New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951, p. 44.
24 Anon, 'Liberty of Conscience', in A. S. P. Woodhouse (ed.), *Puritanism and Liberty*, London, Dent, 1974, p. 247.
25 The foundational 'revisionist' democratic theorist Joseph A. Schumpeter laid the demand for equality at the feet of Christianity; see his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 4th edn, London, Allen and Unwin, 1954, pp. 265–6. Cf. David Sheppard, *Bias to the Poor*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1983; Conrad Boerma, *Rich Man, Poor Man – and the Bible* (trans. John Bowden), London, SCM Press, 1979; Walter E. Pilgrim, *Good News to the Poor*, Minneapolis, Minn., Augsburg Publishing, 1981; Donal Dorr, *Option for the Poor*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1992; Marie Augusta Neal, *The Just Demands of the Poor*, New York, Paulist Press, 1987.
26 John Dewey, 'Democracy and Educational Administration', as quoted in Henry S. Kariel (ed.), *Frontiers of Democratic Theory*, New York, Random House, 1970, p. 13; cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, New York, Scribner's, 1960, p. 133: 'no society, not even a democratic one, is great enough or good enough to make itself the final end of human existence'.
27 Calvin, quoted in Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*, New York, Atheneum, 1968, p. 60; on Calvin's 'hostility to hierarchy, to human rule according to the purposes of human reason', see Ralph C. Hancock, *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 166.
28 Fred D'Agostino, 'Ethical Pluralism and the Role of Opposition in Democratic Politics', *The Monist*, vol. 73, no. 3 (1990), pp. 437–63.
29 Cf. Stephen L. Carter, *The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion*, New York, Anchor Books, 1994, pp. 37–8.
30 Shirley Robin Letwin, 'John Locke: Liberalism and Natural Law', in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), *Traditions of Liberalism*, Sydney, Centre for Independent Studies, 1988, pp. 3–29, at p. 15; cf. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 234–47.
31 Wildavsky, *The Nursing Father*, p. 203, on 'the impenetrable divide between Man and God. No one, not even Moses, can cross that divide'; Hancock, *Calvin and the Foundations*, p. 61: 'transcendence has become so utterly mysterious or remote from human powers as to nullify its political relevance as transcendent; that is, it is no longer relevant to human choice.' Cf. Aram Vartanian, 'Democracy, Religion and the Enlightenment', *The Humanist*, vol. 51 (1991), pp. 9–14.
32 John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government* (1861), in *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*, London, Dent, 1910, p. 183.
33 Martin Luther, as quoted in Gerhard Ebeling, *Luther: An Introduction to his Thought* (trans. R. A. Wilson), Glasgow, Collins, 1972, p. 174.
34 Niebuhr, *Children of Darkness, Children of Light*, p. 82.
35 See Zdravko Planinc, *Plato's Political Philosophy: Prudence in the 'Republic' and the 'Laws'*, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1991, pp. 75–85.
36 Perry Miller (ed.), *Roger Williams: His Contributions to the American Tradition*, New York, Atheneum, 1974, p. 35.

37 John Cotton (in 1650), quoted in Alden T. Vaughan (ed.), *The Puritan Tradition in America 1620–1730*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 204.
38 S. A. Lloyd, *Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's 'Leviathan': The Power of Mind over Matter*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
39 Hancock, *Calvin and the Foundations of Modern Politics*, p. 192.
40 Ibid., p. 20.
41 Cf. J. Davis McCaughy, 'Living in Two Worlds', *Pacifica*, vol. 7 (1994), pp. 1–12.
42 Cf. Leszek Kolakowski, *Religion*, Glasgow, Collins, 1982, p. 226: 'The entire intellectual history of Christianity . . . teems with recurring attempts to restore the pristine calling of Christianity from its adulteration, or simply its domination, by secular aims.'
43 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Christianity in a Secularized World* (trans. John Bowden), London, SCM Press, 1988.
44 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904) (trans. Talcott Parsons), London, Unwin Paperbacks, 1985, pp. 182–3.
45 A. G. Dickens and John Tonkin, *The Reformation in Historical Thought*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, p. 268.
46 M. J. Kitch, *Capitalism and the Reformation*, London, Longman, 1967, pp. xviii–xix.
47 Dickens and Tonkin, *Reformation in Historical Thought*, pp. 272–3.
48 R. H. Tawney, 'Christianity and the Social Revolution', in his *The Attack and Other Papers* (1953), new edn, Nottingham, Spokesman, 1981, p. 158; on the association between Tawney, Beveridge and the originator of the concept 'welfare state', Archbishop William Temple, see David Nicholls, *Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 44–52.
49 Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1938, p. 273.
50 Cf. Kolakowski, *Religion*, p. 226: 'the secular city which absorbs religious values within its goals (as in the young Hegel), makes them "immanent", and consequently deprives them of properly religious meaning'.
51 Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 165; cf. Ross Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and his Times: Socialism as Fellowship*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973, pp. 246–9.
52 Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 280.
53 Cf. Ronald H. Preston, *Religion and the Persistence of Capitalism*, London, SCM Press, 1979, pp. 92–7.
54 John Dunn, *The Politics of Socialism: An Essay in Political Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984; cf. Alex Callinicos, 'Premature Obituaries', *Political Studies*, vol. 51 (1993), pp. 56–65.
55 See J. D. G. Dunn, 'The Justice of God: A Renewed Perspective on Justification by Faith', *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. vol. 43, part 1 (1992), pp. 1–22.
56 Carter, *The Culture of Disbelief*, pp. 86–90.
57 Claes G. Ryn, *Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community*, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1978, p. 85.
58 Richard Kraut, 'The Defense of Justice in Plato's Republic', in Richard Kraut (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 311–37, at pp. 329–30.
59 Strauss, *Jerusalem and Athens*, pp. 27–8.